BSL-3 FAQ

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines four Risk Groups that are classifications to describe the relative hazard posed by infectious agents or toxins in the laboratory:

• Risk Group 1 (RG1) - Agents that are not associated with disease in healthy adult humans. This group includes a list of animal viral etiologic agents in common use. These agents represent no or little risk to an individual and no or little risk to the community.
• Risk Group 2 (RG2) - Agents that are associated with human disease which is rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are often available. These agents pose a moderate risk to an individual but a low risk to the community.
• Risk Group 3 (RG3) - Agents that are associated with serious or lethal human disease but typically have some sort of treatments available. These agents represent a high risk to an individual but a low risk to the community.
• Risk Group 4 (RG4) - Agents that are likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available. These agents represent a high risk to the individual and a high risk to the community.
• Select Agents and Toxins: A list of biological agents and toxins that have been determined by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, to animal and plant health, or to animal or plant products. There are currently 68 select agents and toxins regulated by the Federal Select Agent Program.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines four Laboratory Biosafety Levels that guide the standard microbiological practices, safety equipment, and laboratory facilities required for activities involving infectious microorganisms, toxins, and laboratory animals.

Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) labs are suitable for work with RG2 agents, including: most strains of influenza, Staphylococcus aureus, most Salmonella species, pathogenic strains of E. coli, Klebsiella, adenovirus, rhinovirus, dengue fever virus, Zika virus, measles virus, Listeria monocytogenes, and many attenuated (weakened) strains of higher-risk pathogens such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis, vesicular stomatitis virus, and yellow fever virus.

Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) labs are suitable for work with RG3 agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease through inhalation, including but not limited to: Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Brucella melitensis, and Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Preventative or therapeutic interventions may be available for infectious agents studied in BSL-3 laboratories. Animal Biosafety Level 3 (ABSL-3) refers to laboratory practices suitable for work with animals infected with such agents.

BSL-3 laboratories operate safely alongside other research facilities on university campuses across the country, including many of our peer institutions such as Duke, Emory, Harvard, NYU, Stanford, Tulane, UC-Berkeley, UCSF, USC, and Washington University-St. Louis as well as locally (Northwestern University). Two academic research institutions, Boston University and University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston, support and operate BSL-4 laboratories on their main campuses, which are suited for working with RG4 or Select Agents.

The University of Chicago also has more than 200 BSL-2 labs on its campus in Hyde Park using dozens of human pathogens and additional pathogens that are infectious to plants and animals. 

An element of risk is associated with all laboratory-based research. Multiple hazards in campus labs can be misused (biological, chemical, or radiological) regardless of the biosafety level; however, such research can be conducted safely and responsibly, as demonstrated by our many peer institutions mentioned above. BSL-3 laboratories employ significantly more robust safety measures. When those measures are properly implemented and maintained, BSL-3 research has a strong safety record and is an essential component of developing vaccines, diagnostics, therapeutics, and public health preparedness.

UChicago operates BSL-3 research facilities at the Cummings Life Sciences Center (CLSC) on the Hyde Park campus in Chicago, and the Regional Biocontainment Laboratory known as the Howard Taylor Ricketts Laboratory (HTRL) located at Argonne National Laboratory in Lemont, Illinois. These facilities are managed by the Department of Microbiology and support important infectious diseases research conducted under rigorous biosafety and biosecurity standards.

The University of Chicago has developed and expanded its BSL-3 research capabilities over time. The Howard Taylor Ricketts Laboratory (HTRL) was completed and became operational in December 2009. More recently, a renovated BSL-3 facility at the Cummings Life Sciences Center (CLSC) became operational in February 2026, with additional BSL-3 capacity expected to become operational in September 2026.

Currently, research at the Cummings Life Sciences Center (CLSC) focuses on Mycobacterium tuberculosis (Mtb), the organism that causes tuberculosis. Mtb is managed at BSL-3 because it is an RG3 agent and because it can be transmitted through the air and may cause serious illness. An estimated one-quarter of the world's population has latent tuberculosis infection, meaning they carry the bacterium without symptoms or active disease. Effective treatments are available for both latent infection and active tuberculosis disease.

As the University's research programs evolve, additional BSL-3 agents may be introduced following appropriate regulatory approvals, risk assessments, and safety reviews. Research involving new biological agents is subject to oversight by multiple institutional committees, federal guidelines, and compliance programs to ensure it is conducted safely and in accordance with all applicable regulations and biosafety standards.

The Howard Taylor Ricketts Laboratory (HTRL) was built with support from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and is one of twelve Regional Biocontainment Laboratories with state-of-the-art BSL-3 facilities. The facility is well-suited to support research involving Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and space has been allocated to support such research. The remaining space is used to respond to emerging infectious pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 (as required by the federal National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases), and to perform Select Agent research that cannot be conducted elsewhere at the University of Chicago. 

The Biological Sciences Division and the University of Chicago are broadly committed to building a nationally renowned program to study and treat emergent infectious diseases, and the availability of BSL-3 and ABSL-3 facilities on campus is a competitive advantage in this recruitment effort.

In 2009, a University of Chicago researcher died from a laboratory-acquired infection with an attenuated strain of Yersinia pestis (KIM D27). The strain had not been known to have caused laboratory-acquired infections or human fatalities, and the work was being conducted in a BSL-2 facility. Following investigation by the University and public health authorities, the researcher was later found to have a genetic condition that made him uniquely susceptible to infection, making the attenuated strain fatally virulent. You can find more information about this case from the CDC.

In 2011, a researcher working in another BSL-2 facility acquired a skin infection with a modified strain of Bacillus cereus, requiring hospitalization. Later investigation found that the infection was likely acquired from a surface that had not been properly decontaminated.

Following the above two lab-acquired infections, the University of Chicago established a campus-wide Office of Research Safety (ORS) that partners with researchers across campus to ensure that laboratory research is conducted safely and according to federal and institutional guidelines. The biological safety team provides training and guidance to investigators, staff, and students performing laboratory research with hazardous biological materials. Their team of experts oversees all University-sponsored research involving microorganisms that pose hazards to humans.

ORS works closely with the Biological Sciences Division (BSD), facility management teams, and research groups conducting work in UChicago’s BSL-3 facilities to ensure that all research is performed safely, in compliance, and conducted in a way that minimizes risk to laboratory personnel and the surrounding community and environment. 

ORS's responsibilities include conducting risk assessments, reviewing research protocols, providing specialized training, performing routine inspections, supporting incident reporting and corrective actions, overseeing biosafety and biosecurity compliance, and coordinating with researchers and Facilities Services on operational and access-related needs. Together, these efforts help protect laboratory personnel, the surrounding community, and the environment while supporting the safe and effective operation of the facilities.

Building upon years of experience monitoring the HTRL BSL-3 facility, ORS works closely with the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which consists of subject matter experts (UChicago faculty, veterinarians, and physicians) as well as community members who have no affiliation with the University. This group assesses risk on a regular basis, and IBC protocol review and approval is required for all research involving pathogenic microorganisms, whether human, animal, or plant pathogen.

In general, ORS and the BSD encourage a strong culture of safety and accountability for all lab spaces throughout campus, regardless of their biosafety level.

• Laboratory staff should always follow safety protocols and encourage accountability among their colleagues.
• Staff should be respectful of other building occupants. While they may not work in a BSL-3 lab themselves, research staff should avoid giving the impression of lax safety standards by wearing PPE into common areas, for example, or allowing unknown individuals to “piggyback” access through secured doors, elevators, and stairwells.

The Cummings Life Sciences Center is an active research and classroom facility. Due to the diverse group of faculty, students, research personnel, and administrative staff that need to access the building, it cannot be secured simply at the ground-floor entrances alone, although key card access is required to enter the building.

The ORS and the BSD Facilities design team have implemented five tiers of security for the building and the lab facilities on its upper floors:

1. Restricted proximity card access for BSD staff at the north and south doors. Students who need to attend classes in Cummings will also be granted access in coordination with the registrar’s office.
2. Restricted proximity card access for BSD staff to the elevators.
3. Restricted proximity card access to specific floors where the facilities are located from all elevators and stairwells, limited to only those staff who need access to labs located on those floors. Individuals cannot obtain card access to these floors until they have taken an awareness training session administered by the Department of Microbiology.
4. Restricted keypad or card access to BSL-3 suites.
5. CCTV camera monitors in the building lobby and hallways on specific floors.

The University consults with faculty researchers who work in Cummings to devise access plans that are both safe and conducive to efficient operations. This document is updated accordingly as these plans evolve.

Access to the BSL-3 facility at HTRL requires federal security clearance approval and strict background checks.

Commissioning BSL-3 space involves specific changes to control access and movement through the labs, processes for cleaning, autoclaving, and decontamination, installation of enclosed, ventilated biosafety cabinets for working with pathogens, and changes to ventilation to separate air flow from the rest of the building. This also includes contingency plans to monitor building systems for power loss or other malfunctions, and mechanisms for isolating the lab space in the event of a biosafety incident, fire, or natural disaster.

In addition to facility enhancements required for BSL-3 laboratories in Appendix A below and security measures detailed in #10 above, management of BSL-3 labs differs from the management of BSL-2 labs in the following ways:

1. Two lab inspections a year are required, compared to annually for BSL-1 and BSL-2 labs.
2. ORS requires and approves all protocols involving inactivation of the pathogens being used.
3. Removal of materials from the lab is tracked.
4. Transport of materials within Hyde Park is tracked.
5. Waste is autoclaved prior to disposal and incineration by the University’s biomedical waste contractor.

Source: UChicago Office of Research Safety